Published originally as a LinkedIn article: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/europe-preparing-wrong-war-ukraine-cedric-de-coning-nrv4f/
Over the last few months, the political and diplomatic focus in Europe’s capitals has been on putting togerther a coalition of the willing that can deploy a credible reassurance force in Ukraine to help secure a ceasefire. There is a risk, however, that Europe may be making the classical mistake of preparing for the last war.
If Russia agrees to a ceasefire and peace agreement it may be because they have decided to pursue another tack. The conventional war did not go well for them. They had more success with hybrid war in Ukraine and elsewhere. A peace agreement will lead to the immediate lifting of United States sanctions on Russia and get Putin back on the international stage where he, alongside Xi and Trump, can be one of the big men of the new global order. These are much more attractive options for Russia then continuing a slow costly conventional war.
The reasoning behind the reassurance force is a concern that Russia will agree to a ceasefire as a tactic to regroup and rearm, and that it will then continue the war after a pause. Investing in Ukraine’s capacity to continue to defend itself against potential future Russian aggression will have to be an important part of any European strategy to support Ukraine and deter Russia. Up to now Ukraine has been able to effectively defend itself with Western support, and the most logical military investment would be in Ukraine’s future capability to defend itself from a military attack. In a post-ceasefire scenario, it may thus be more efficient and effective to focus European resources on helping Ukraine to build up its military capabilities, rather than to spend it on deploying a European reassurance force to help defend Ukraine against the last war, when Russia has in the meantime, moved on to a new hybrid strategy.
The hybrid alternative that Russia has employed in in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and elsewhere at a fraction of the political and economic cost, and with greater effectiveness than conventional war, is to use influence operations to undermine social cohesion and to interfere in the domestic political process. The aim of a hybrid war in Ukraine would be to disrupt Ukrainian society to the extent that it is neither a threat to Russia, nor an attractive ally for Europe (think EU membership). And the long game would be to have Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of influence with a Russia friendly government in Kiev.
A ceasefire or peace agreement provides Russia with the opportunity to pivot its Ukraine strategy from conventional to hybrid war. To justify the decision to go to war and its cost, the Kremlin will try to negotiate the best possible deal for Russia, so that it can sell the war and ceasefire to its elite, population and allies as a win. This may be one of the reasons why Russia wants to link a ceasefire with peace agreement.
More importantly, a ceasefire and peace agreement offers Putin a pathway back to the international stage and economic recovery. A cease-fire deal mediated by Trump will give Putin a photo opportunity in the White House that will signal to the world that he has been accepted back onto the world’s diplomatic stage. After that he can appear again in person on the international stage alongside Trump and Xi, as one of the big men of the new global order. It will also result in the US lifting economic sanctions against Russia that will help Russia’s economic recovery. This is an attractive alternative future for Putin and makes strategic sense for the Kremlin, its elites, population and allies.
If this is a likely scenario, then where does it leaves Europe and its reassurance force strategy? If the war will pivot from conventional to hybrid war, then a major priority for Europe should be to help Ukraine to survive a new hybrid onslaught on its society and institutions. Russia’s first target will be the post-war elections in Ukraine, but this will be a multi-year strategy. Europe’s focus, in addition to helping Ukraine counter the hybrid war, should be on economic investment in the Ukrainian post-war economy, and to prepare its society and institutions for European Union membership.
The most effective leverage Europe had over Russia to date, in parallel with its military support to Ukraine, was the pressure it has been able to exert on the Russian economy. The fact that one of the specific demands Russia has made in the negotiations with the US was for it to be allowed back into the SWIFT payment system, reflect how effective the economic sanctions has been. Going forward, and in support of Ukraine in a hybrid war scenario, one of Europe’s most effective levers of influence on Russia will remain its economic diplomacy. Europe should wield it smartly, relieving the economic pressure slowly step by step to reward desirable behaviour, and increasing it back-up step by step to punish undesirable behaviour, without ever becoming dependent again on Russian energy.
There is no absolute guarantee for a successful outcome of a ceasefire or peace agreement in Ukraine, but by combining economic efforts to strengthen social cohesion, helping to protect the political process against hybrid interference, smart economic pressure on Russia, and by supporting Ukraine to further build-up its military capabilities, Europe will be investing in a comprehensive approach that covers a range of scenarios and counters Russia on several fronts.
Cedric de Coning is a research professor with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
Complexity 4 Peace 